View in searchable PDF format: 1970 – Leon Letwin, Civil Disobedience Law Seminar.OCR
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LOS ANGELES: SCHOOL OF LAW
January 15, 1970
TO: Ray Goldstone
FROM: Leon Letwin
In Schwartz’s article that we used in the first
session, he says that Perkins in “The University and
Due Process, December 8, 1967″ (a reprint of an address
to the American Council on Education, Washington, D.C.)
“conjures up a chamber of horrors involving incompetent
charges rendering decisions on student grades, personal
behavior and a multitude of other matters. It pleads
for a respect for the autonomy of the University ••
Do you have the speech? It might be useful as a
statement of the argument against court involvement in
University affairs which comes up in a second session.
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-(LeUerhead fer Interdepartmental Use)
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SEMINAR ENROLLMENT
Winter 1970
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It is a commonplace that the campus toea~ is an incredibly
different place today than it was when populated by “the silent
generation” of the 1950’s. Student concern with the gap between
professed human values and the real world runs far broader and
deeper. And there have been impressive changes in attitude as
to personal responsibility for participating in efforts to produce
change. While these attitudes have rarely, if ever, moved
a majorit y of students into action, they have episodically moved
f airly large numbers and, perhaps equally important, the impulse
motivating the activist has from time to time received widespread,
t hough passive, support of the majority. Accompanying these
changes have also come important changes in attitude toward what
constitutes effective or appropriate forms of political action,
and toward the appropriate degree of deference or respect due to
the “established order.” the “status quo,” the “system.”
In such a setting it seems artificial to begin a review of
student-university legal relationships by focusing on, say,
procedural due process on the campus. While this wasafrontier
issue but a few years ago, it is today regarded by significant
numbers of students as of minor importance, not the “real issue.”
It seems worth spending the introductory session surveying aspects
of the general campus atmosphere.
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The chrrent literature on “civil disobedience” helps in two
.respects:A the content and intensity of present-day student social
concerns , and it presents some of the attitudes toward appropriate
mechanisms of social change and toward legality and authority.
In reading these materials you may wish to keep before you
the following questions:
1) What are the differing attitudes toward “the system”
represented by the conflicting viewpoints presented on “civil
disobedience”–what it is and what it implies? Is “civil disobedience”
revolutionary? What are the varying positions toward the
appropriateness of demanding”a.mnesty” for acts of disobedience or
illegality? To what degree are these differences reducible to
more fundamental differences in assumption or objectives of those
ranged on either side of the issue?
2) Are the justifications that might be offered for civil
disobedience stronger or weaker in the campus context than elsewhere?
Should the response to acts of civil disobedience be any
different on the campus than in other sections of the community?
How?
3) What kinds of arguments would those who have engaged in
politically inspired acts of violence be inclined to offer as
justification for such course of a ction?
4) What are the implications for the lawyer defending those
charged with acts of civil disobedience? What are the implications
and responsibilities of the lawyer whose client insists on engaging
in civil disobedience within the courtroom, e.g. refusing to accord
the traditional forms of respect .to the judge, etc.
* * *
On reserve:
Fortas, Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience
Zinn, Disobedience and Democracy
2
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ROUGH DRAFT January 23, 1970
Retrospective Comment on Week 2
1 now think we should proceed entirely differently than
we had in the introductory weeks. We should drop the introduction
on civil disobedience, and drop Week 2 as it now
stands.
All, or at least a major part of the seminar, should be
structured along problem-solving lines.
Week 1 could start, for example, with the facts of
Jones v. Board of Education for the State of Tennessee,
279 F.2d 190 (1968). These facts raise a variable parade of
horribles, suggesting every possible objection that people
might have to any university disciplinary proceeding: the
absence of adequately spelled out standards of conduct;
promulgation problems; the substance of the rules; the way
in which they were applied; procedural flaws; constitutional
flaws; and the like. One could spend an entire introductory
session giving people the opportunity to react on a
level to the issues raised. Session 2 could involve asking
half the class, say, to draft a complaint and the other half
to draft a motion to strike the complaint for failure to state
a cause of action. One could give them § 1983 of the Civil
and
Rights Act,/other code provisions. · ane could, to complicate
the issue, assume that the school was a private school so as
to raise the state action question. One could give them a
variety of cases to which we now have represented in Week 2 f
dealing with right/privilege, state action, contract theories
as applied to private schools to give them a basis for thinking
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through the theory on which the complaint would be founded.
One could also include issues of ness
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whether exhaustion of remedies, the propriety of preliminary
injunctions, etc.
The whole enterprise could be entitled “Jurisdiction”
to illustrate that the point is to raise the threshold questions
– of the theory on whether one can even get into court on such
claims and, if so, on what theories?
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II.
These materials are intended to serve a number of purposes.
A. Background. Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, and
Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Academic Freedom, describe
the trend toward constitutionalization of campus relationships,
til recently left largely to the unfettered discretion of “the
University”–i.e., its faculty and administration. The cases
included are samples of various approaches, old and new.
For background purposes 2 other items not included here
may be useful.
Developments in the Law, Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L.
Rev. 1045 (1968) (extremely comprehensive)
Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making
Power of Public Universities: Some Constitutional
Considerations, 2 Law in Transition Q. 1 (1965)
B. The Broad Legal Concepts. The debate as to whether there
were constitutional limits on how universities could conduct themselves
in relation to students (and faculty) took place in the
context of several legal issues. In the public universities the
debate focused on the privilege/right distinction, discussed in a
general way by Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law.
In the area of the private schools, the debate tended to
focus on the scope of “state action” (were the private schools to
be viewed as public institutions for constitutional purposes?),
or on whether contract or tort theory could somehow be stretched·
to impose, in effect, constitutional restrictions on private schools
that were however not operative by their own force.
c. The Broad Policy Issues. Is it desirable to impose a
regime of external legal norms upon the workings of the university?
What are the classic arguments against it? This is dealt with to
one or another degree in each of the cases included in the materials.
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III.
The first document, “A Judicial Document on Student Discipline,”
is an interesting opinion, first, for its legislative quality, and
secondly, for philosophic premises it relies on in specifying the
due process requirements of a campus adjudicatory system. A somewhat
different philosophy (at least as to what is desirable if not constitutionally
required) presumably underpins the ‘~CLA Code of
Procedures Regarding Student Conduct.” Please read both documents
now, not for their detailed provisions but to get a sense of the
general viewpoints they seem to represent. Next week we will return
to a more leisurely consideration of particular problems in relation
to the UCLA Code.
The Goldstone and Lovell article comments in a general way on
the UCLA Code. It also discusses the issue raised by the fact that
the UCLA Campus Conduct Committee’s decision is merely advisory to
the Chancellor, not binding upon him.
The remaining materials raised issues 1) as to the right of
counsel in a campus proceeding and the role of non-lawyer student
advisors. You may wish to consider the legal and ethical problems
facing law students participating in such proceedings; 2) arising
out of selective enforcement of rules of conduct by the university
administration; and 3) as to the relationship between a student
conduct committee hearing and a criminal trial arising out of the
same transaction.